Few outside the company paid attention when Nvidia’s long-serving chief security officer and product security lead resigned in August. However, merely two and a half months later, CEO Jensen Huang himself departed amid escalating inquiries into his extramarital affairs, initially involving an executive from Megaspeed, a Singaporean data center firm that U.S. investigators suspect of illicitly supplying Nvidia chips to China, and subsequently extending to reports of two distinct relationships with Nvidia staff.
David Reber, who served as CSO for four years and was with Nvidia for seven, stated at the time that his departure was due to health concerns. In late August, he posted on LinkedIn, revealing a diagnosis of young-onset Parkinson’s over two years prior, remarking, “This wasn’t a planned change. But I know what needs to come first: family and health.”
Saša Zdjelar, Reber’s successor, previously held a senior IT manager role at ExxonMobil in Houston for 17 years, followed by a year at Salesforce and multiple years at the cybersecurity firm ReversingLabs. Zdjelar declined to comment on Thursday regarding the leadership change or the security team’s awareness of the situation.
While there is no public link between Reber’s or Zdjelar’s altered roles and the Megaspeed situation, it is reasonable to question the extent of Nvidia’s security team’s knowledge regarding the government’s investigation into Megaspeed and Huang’s personal relationships, and if any concerns were raised. Reber did not reply to Thursday’s inquiries, and Nvidia has also not addressed our relevant questions.
Ordinarily, relationships between a CEO and their staff are managed by HR, legal, and the board, rather than the security department. However, security experts contend that any affair, even an internal one, could provide a foreign intelligence service with leverage over an executive keen to keep it private. Huang’s relationship with an executive at Megaspeed, a company facing federal investigation, extends beyond typical workplace concerns. (Megaspeed has denied all allegations of misconduct.)
Nevertheless, identifying such indicators is challenging. Nicholas Eftimiades, a retired senior intelligence officer who claims to have trained over 1,000 corporate security professionals, explains that intelligence services often gather information through routine conversations rather than cyberattacks, which significantly complicates risk identification for security teams.
Portions of this scenario were evidently known by some within Nvidia. The New York Times reported earlier this week that Nvidia’s chief legal counsel had been involved in the government’s Megaspeed inquiry for over a year. (Nvidia states it maintains regular contact with officials.) Furthermore, accounts of Huang’s relationships with employees imply that colleagues were also aware, even if such conduct isn’t explicitly prohibited by Nvidia’s code of conduct. The Times mentioned five Nvidia employees who indicated his involvement with a directly reporting vice president; Reuters, referencing two individuals, later reported a second affair. The crucial unanswered question is whether any of this information reached the security department.
Even if the security team had been informed, Eftimiades, author of the 2020 book Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics, informed TechCrunch that security teams frequently operate with constrained resources. They are often underfunded, he explained, because they do not directly generate revenue, unlike other cost centers. He noted that it is remarkably common for CEOs to dismiss security warnings with the phrase, “not a nickel more than compliance.”
Experts suggest that numerous companies adopt an excessively restrictive definition of security. In an opinion piece published in The Hill, Don Aviv, CEO of Interfor International, a corporate investigations firm, and author Jeremy Hurewitz, asserted that, “Too many companies still approach security primarily as a matter of protecting facilities, preventing cyberattacks, and responding to physical threats.” They contended that, “[s]ecurity teams need to pay greater attention to insider threats, including the cultivation of executives and employees by foreign intelligence services, suspicious business relationships, conflicts of interest and attempts to obtain sensitive information through trusted personal contacts.”
Considering Nvidia’s extensive scale and numerous business partnerships, it would be unexpected if its security team did not possess a broader scope of responsibilities than that of most companies, though such a possibility exists.
To be fair, certain aspects simply exceed the capabilities of any single team. Eftimiades, speaking generally and not specifically about Huang, presented a hypothetical scenario where a CEO laments an inability to act because “I’m fighting a board who doesn’t want to do this.” This statement, he explained, reveals the obstacle to an intelligence asset. The intelligence service then identifies the “sticking point” and seeks vulnerabilities in that individual’s email and phone communications.
Often, a rival intelligence service prioritizes policy insights over technological specifics, such as identifying key figures advocating for export rule changes or those obstructing them. He likened the “intel world” to cancer, stating, “Once it gets into the body, it looks to spread and looks to reach out.”
Eftimiades noted that this operational blueprint is not new, “especially concerning China.” He claimed that any executive engaging with China “will tell you that they’ve been approached.” He also mentioned numerous anecdotes of U.S. diplomats discovering a woman on their hotel bed. He highlighted that a more recent development, compared to Soviet-era espionage, is the extended duration—often years instead of weeks—of relationships cultivated by these intelligence services.
Technology can enhance human intelligence, Eftimiades explained, citing IMSI catchers as an illustration. These devices emulate a cell tower, causing nearby mobile phones to connect to them. He noted that a fundamental model might cost around $1,000 and be suitcase-portable, while government-tier versions are considerably more expensive; he mentioned a few Chinese espionage incidents last year where these devices played a role.
Eftimiades stated that it remains unknown whether such devices were employed against Huang, whose phone was presumably secured to detect, if not entirely prevent, compromises. However, the extent of Nvidia’s security team’s knowledge and their capacity to respond will only be revealed as the board’s independent investigation and federal inquiries advance.
Meanwhile, Eftimiades expressed his hope that this entire incident serves as “a wake-up call” for U.S. industry, which he described as largely “clueless” regarding China’s strategies. He estimated, “We have lost trillions [of dollars] in intellectual property.” He concluded, “Whatever we think we’re doing isn’t working.”